Jerry on PieFed

Just a techie guy running feddit.online to allow people to communicate, make friends and acquaintances. Odd coming from a happy introvert, right? (https://jerry.hear-me.blog/about)

I also own these publicly available applications:
Mastodon: https://hear-me.social/
Alternative Mastodon UI: https://phanpy.hear-me.social/
Peertube: https://my-sunshine.video/
Friendica: https://my-place.social/
Matrix: https://element.secure-channel.net/
XMPP/Jabber: https://between-us.online/
Bluesky PDS: https://blue-ocean.social/ (jerry.blue-ocean.social) Mobilizon (Facebook Events Alt): https://my-group.events/
and more…

  • 4 Posts
  • 9 Comments
Joined 2 years ago
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Cake day: September 29th, 2024

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  • My understanding is that while the older Pixel phones had MTE capability, it was off by default and could only be enabled under the dev settings. Google did not enable it by default because Android depends heavily on vendor board support packages, proprietary SOC drivers, and HAL modules. Google felt that driver code quality from 3rd-parties is not clean enough to enable kernel-level MTE without risking bootloops and spontaneous reboots. Even worse for C++ apps, which often read slightly past their allocated memory blocks.

    Instead, Google rewrote critical core Android system daemons using Rust. Like the keystore, Bluetooth stack, DNS resolver, and others. I believe using Rust essentially makes MTE unnecessary.

    Also full synchronous MTE mode has high CPU/memory bus penalties (could be 5-10% under heavy memory loads).

    Google probably decided that since hardly anyone used MTE anyway on earlier Pixel devices, they could use the space in the chip for other uses.

    The point is that the post makes it sound like using a Pixel 11 under Android results in less security than before, but for most people there is no change since they never used MTE anyway.







  • It’s worse than you think. An IMSI catcher is not even needed to find out what phones are in an area:

    Section 3.4.1: Presence Testing in LTE
    https://www.eff.org/wp/gotta-catch-em-all-understanding-how-imsi-catchers-exploit-cell-networks

    Passive Presence Testing

    The simplest way to do presence testing in LTE doesn’t actually require someone to have what we usually consider a CSS (e.g. a device that pretends to be a legitimate cell tower). Instead, all that’s required is simple radio equipment to scan the LTE frequencies, e.g. an antenna, an SDR (Software Defined Radio), and a laptop. Passive presence testing gets its name because the attacker doesn’t actually need to do anything other than scan for readily available signals (Shaik et al, 2017).

    RRC paging messages are usually addressed to a TMSI, but sometimes IMSI and IMEI are also used. By monitoring these unencrypted paging channels, anyone can record the IMSIs and TMSIs the network believes is in a given area . In the next section, we’ll see how an attacker can correlate a TMSI to a specific target phone, as right now collecting TMSIs simply means recording pseudonyms.

    There are descriptions in the article of other ways to find phones without using an IMSI Catcher or fake tower.